Christmas Terror in the Skies - What Really Went Wrong?

System Analysis by Fraud Detective and Security Expert Steve Lee Managing Partner of Steve Lee & Associates

Terrorist suspect Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab became the perfect Grinch who stole Christmas when he attempted to ignite explosives aboard Northwest Airlines Flight 253 en route from Amsterdam to Detroit. This near tragic incident has sparked a great deal of debate amongst our leaders and others about why it occurred, who is to blame and what should be done to prevent its repetition, even prompting President Obama to weigh in on the matter particularly after his Homeland Security Chief’s comment to the effect that the system worked.

The reactions and responses of our leaders and others to this event have for the most part been “knee jerk” and politically motivated rather than reflective of a genuine concern for the flying public and aviation professionals. No blankets on our laps? No visits to the bathroom during the last hour of the flight? Come on. If we are really concerned about explosive underwear, why not just require us to change into hospital gowns before each flight, or place our underwear into the same bin as our shoes at the security checkpoint, or just fly “commando”? That seems at least literally appropriate. If we really think the Christmas scenario is likely to be repeated, such passive procedures certainly will not prove to be effective. Check point screening procedures are designed to catch non-terrorist travelers attempting to bring more than 3 ounces of hair product on board an airplane. There are so many examples of individuals successfully bringing pistols and edged weapons through security and onto airplanes, how can anyone really be shocked that explosive material was brought aboard Flight 253? The passengers of Flight 253 are just fortunate that the perpetrator knew almost as little about the explosive and how to detonate it as did the airport security personnel in Amsterdam.

By and large, the security agencies of the United States have done an excellent job for the last eight years of detecting and interdicting threats long before they get to TSA and international security check points. However, the security check point is not the place where “the rubber meets the road” in counter-terrorism. If it were, we would all be in serious trouble. While TSA and international security standards have improved over the last eight years, protocols and security philosophy do not include behavioral evaluation, situational awareness, or threat recognition consistent with effective counter-terrorism training. To be fair, expecting TSA and international security screening personnel to have legitimate counter-terrorism experience is like expecting your coffee shop barista to be an “iron chef” or your typical security guard to know how to run a hostage rescue team. Generally, terrorist detection and intervention takes place long before a suspect sets foot into an airport.

While the immediacy of our leaders’ reactions are certainly warranted, in my opinion the focus of this reaction is misdirected. In simple terms, the actions or inactions of TSA and its international counterparts at airport security check points around the world are not responsible for this breakdown. I am also unconvinced that the fault can be laid at the feet of individual intelligence or law enforcement professionals. Rather, we should be focused on our leadership and examining the role that politician’s policies and practices in the areas of intelligence and inter-agency communication played in allowing this potentially fatal incident to occur.

What is most troubling to me about this event is the apparent breakdown in communications that took place after the suspect’s father attempted to warn authorities about his son’s “radicalization”, even though it now appears that the suspect was being tracked by some components of United States intelligence. It seems to me that there are two possible reasons why the father’s warnings were largely unheeded. First, the father may not have been considered credible, thus causing the reported threat not to be taken seriously at intake. Second, if it is true that the father spoke directly to intelligence personnel, then someone in the professional’s reporting chain failed to pass on this information to analysts or agencies where good use of the disclosures could have been made. Such intra-agency or inter-agency communication problems would be reminiscent of those with which we were faced before the World Trade Center attack on 9/11 - despite the advent of Homeland Security. If that is indeed what happened, it is simply terrifying. With effective communication technologies and protocols in place, as is generally the case these days, it is unlikely that a hardware or system failure caused any breakdown in communications. So what did?

Poor communication suggests a failure at a policy and leadership level. We all know that our national attention has been focused elsewhere – the financial crisis, the national healthcare debate and so on. If, at the national leadership level, we demonstrate by example that counter-terrorism is no longer a top priority, that we want to be more permeable and accessible to foreign interests, and that we are deeply concerned about the profiling of potential terrorist threats, then government agencies, law enforcement, security personnel and others will tend to follow that leadership, either explicitly or implicitly. Miscommunications such as the one characterized above will be more prone to occur. Well, our allies and friends throughout the world tend to follow our lead in security matters, whether or not they want to admit it. Thus, if we appear to de-prioritize our counter-terrorism efforts, if we appear to adopt a more permeable and accessible posture towards foreign interests and if we appear overly concerned about the manner in which we identify potential terrorist threats, then our international constituents will follow suit.

If you travel frequently by air, like I do, I am sure you can sense (if your “radar” is deployed) that passenger safety and security is no longer the most important concern of airlines and airport security personnel. When, for example, is the last time you sensed that a United States Air Marshall was on your flight? You may well ask: “What does this have to do with a terrorist slipping through security with explosives in Amsterdam?” It has everything to do with it. Without the re-prioritization of counter-terrorism and continued emphasis on security – even if that emphasis manifests itself from time-to-time as politically incorrect – I am deeply concerned that we are inviting another terrorist to strap on the explosive device du jour and board an airline bound for one of our great American cities.